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MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE CORPORATE
"SQUEEZE" AND "FREEZE"
ANY GRouP within a corporation which controls sufficient shares of
stock to elect a majority of the directors and to dictate the outcome of
stockholders' votes in other instances has, through the use of a variety
of devices, the power unconscionably to benefit its members at the ex-
pense of the minority stockholders. For example, a shareholder or
group of shareholders may be deprived of any voice in the making of
corporate decisions, or even be forced completely out of the corporation.
In like manner, one class of stock may successfully pursue plans tailored
to serve its ends at the expense of other classes. A majority thus bent on
applying a corporate "squeeze" or "freeze" is immeasurably aided by
traditional judicial reluctance to interfere in corporate affairs." More-
over, many stockholders not only are unaware of the protections given
them by law against unfair treatment, but, having only slight knowledge
of the intricacies of corporate mechanics, often do not recognize the
harmful potential of certain policies until it is too late-especially when
management fails to make adequate reports to stockholders. These
factors combine to make the position of the minority stockholder in some
corporations, notably the close corporation, an insecure and financially
dangerous one.
In an attempt to shield minority stockholders from some of the
more flagrant abuses at the hands of the majority, the courts have
verbalized in vague terms the situations in which judicial interference
with corporate activities may be expected. Most courts recognize, to
some extent at least, that majority stockholders owe to minority interests
some sort of a fiduciary duty.2 Yet, these courts are disposed to aid the
1See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 278, 285, 295 (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter
cited as BALLANTINE].
-' "The same considerations of fundamental justice which impose a fiduciary char-
acter upon the relationship of the directors to the stockholders will also impose, in a
proper case, a like character upon the relationship which the majority of the stockholders
bear to the minority. When, in the conduct of the corporate business, a majority
of the voting power in the corporation join hands in imposing its policy upon all, it is
beyond all reason and contrary, it seems to me, to the plainest dictates of what is just
and right, to take any view other than that they are to be regarded as having placed
upon themselves the same sort of fiduciary character which the law impresses upon the
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minority only when acts of the majority can be characterized as abusive
of discretion,3 unreasonable or arbitrary,4 in bad faith,5 or fraudulent.'
These somewhat amorphous standards, combined with the fact that the
burden of proof rests on the complainant 7 make the minority stock-
holder's position in court difficult. About all that can be said in a
general way is that while there is unquestionably a legitimate sphere in
which the majority, by virtue of its position, can act in its own interest,
even if the minority suffers, there is at least a subjective line beyond
which the majority cannot transgress without risking judicial sanction.
Minority stockholders also have the theoretical benefit of statutory
and charter safeguards which purport to protect their interests against
the power of the majority, the most prominent examples of which are
provisions for class and cumulative voting and high vote requirements
for certain fundamental changes. Even so, the power commanded by
those in control of a corporation is usually sufficiently overwhelming to
insure successful pursuit of most indicated courses of action.
DIVIDEND WITHHOLDING AND HIGH SALARIES
The declaration of dividends is traditionally regarded as a matter
within the sole discretion of the board of directors." Therefore, with
control of the board of directors, the majority can insure that surpluses
remain in the corporate treasury and can cause annual profits, which
might otherwise be used to pay dividends, to be added to reserve or
surplus accounts. When majority shareholders also occupy managerial
positions, they can make the squeeze particularly effective by siphoning
off profits in the form of larger salaries for themselves, for, within vague
directors in their relation to all the stockholders. . . . Unless the majority in such a
case are to be regarded as owing a duty to the minority such as is owed by the directors to
all, then the minority are in a situation which exposes them to the grossest frauds and
subjects them to most outrageous wrongs." Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel &
Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. i, 12-13, i2o Atl. 486, 491 (1923).
'Jones v. Motor Sales Co., 322 Pa. 492, 185 Atl. 8o9 (1936).
" Channon v. Channon Co., 218 Ill. App. 397 (1gzo).
'Stevens v. United States Steel Corp., 68 N.J. Eq. 373, 59 Atl. 9o5 (Ch. x9o5) 5
Tefft v. Schaefer, 136 Wash. 302, 239 Pac. 837 (1925).
a Mobile Towing & Wrecking Co. v. Hartwell, zo8 Ala. 420, 95 So. 191 (1922).
'Waldrop v. Martin, 237 Ala. 556, i88 So. 59 ('939) Allaun v. Consolidated Oil
Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 At. 257 (1929) i Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refining Corp.,
14 Del. Ch. 193, 126 Atl. 46 (1924).
'BALLANTINE § 42.
"See Casson v. Bosman, 137 N.J. Eq. 532, 45 A.2d 807 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946)
Jones v. Motor Sales Co., 322 Pa. 492, 185 At. 809 (1936). See Generally, Frey,
The Distribution of Corporate Dividends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 735 (1941).
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limits, the determination of compensation is likewise a matter left en-
tirely to the discretion of directors." Such corporate policies have a
natural tendency to lower the market value of the stock, which, in turn,
may pressure the minority to sell its shares to the majority at less than
their actual worth. The possible denouement is that the majority ulti-
mately may acquire complete ownership of the corporation at an unfairly
low price, thereby depriving the minority of much of its original invest-
ment, as well as the opportunity to participate in a going concern.
In determining whether the corporate majority has acted properly
in withholding dividends, the courts have emphasized several factors.
Prominent among these is the corporation's business needs." Althougfi
it is difficult to find a case where relief was granted solely because the
business did not need additional capital, consideration of this factor in
practically every judicial opinion involving dividend withholding attests
its importance. 2 Where the corporation has needed large amounts of
working or expansion capital, sustained retention of funds has been
upheld.'3 On the other hand, when it has appeared, along with other
factors indicating majority abuse, that profits have been withheld wholly
out of proportion to the needs of the business, courts have forced a divi-
dend payment.' 4 Among the criteria employed to dispose of cases falling
10 "The discretion of the directors as to the proper amount of compensation for execu-
tive officers is wide, but it may be judicially reviewed and does not extend to wasteful
diversion of income, leaving no fair return to the shareholders." BALLENTINE § 23!,
at 552. See Washington, The Corporation Executive's Living Wage, 54 HARV. L. REV.
733, 756, 770 (194).
' See Thomas v. Matthews, 94 Ohio St. 32, 113 N.E. 669 (1916), where the court
said that the directors were to consider the needs of the business, the sums necessary for
its operation until income from further operations was available, the amount of its
debts and whether they should be paid, and the character of its surplus assets, whether
cash, credits, or merchandise. Another court has said that whether dividends should be
paid "depends usually on several considerations, is a relative question, not always suscep-
tible of clear demonstration, and is a matter, to a considerable extent, of good judgment
in conducting the company's business, and of good faith in upholding its contracts on
the part of directors." Hazeltine v. Belfast & M.H.L. R.R., 79 Me. 41!, io Atl. 318,
330 (1887). See also, Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S.W.
9! (1927).
1" See cases in note i x supra.
1"See Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 299, 6o Ad. 94! (Ch.
1905); Gesell v. Tomahawk Land Co., i84,Wis. 537, 2oo N.W. 550 (1974). Bal-
lantine argues that expansion capital should be raised at least partly by new financing
rather than by withholding dividends on the preferred shares, particularly where com-
mon shareholders are controlling the coporation. BALLANTINE § 232, at 555.
"
4See Crichton v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167, 36 So. 926 (19o4), where the
court forced the declaration of a dividend because, among other reasons, the corporation
had made profits of over io times the amount of original capitalization. See also
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between the two extremes are: the amount of working capital required
in prior years; an estimate of future business prospects5 the size of any
existing surpluses; an estimate of the cost of any proposed expansion;
and a consideration of the liabilities to which the corporation is, or
reasonably may be, subject in the near future. The utilization of such
criteria to show retention of funds beyond reasonable need, however, is
made exceedingly difficult by the complexities of modern business and
the current expanding nature of our economy. 5 Conceivably, a court
might order payment of a dividend in spite of a need for more capital,
thus compelling the management to raise funds from other sources; but
this would, indeed, be unlikely.
Evidence of a conflict of interests between the members of the ma-
jority and the minority has also been deemed significant in dividend
withholding cases. One court acceded to the minority's request upon a
showing that the majority was withholding dividends solely to obtain
personal tax advantages.' 6 Relief was also granted where it was proved
that dividends were withheld so that corporate debts, incurred to the
majority in self-dealing contracts, could be satisfied.17  Similarly, evi-
dence of outright hostility toward the minority or of an intent to drive
the minority out of the corporation bears directly on the issue of conflict
of interest.' 8  In sum, any evidence that the majority has deliberately
exploited its power unreasonably to further selfish ends at the expense of
Hiscock v. Lacy, 9 Misc. 578, 30 N.Y. Supp. 86o (Sup. Ct. 1894). For a recent treat-
ment of this problem, see the comparative law note in 5959 DUKE L.J. 116, 1z.
"C In one case the court pointed out that virtually all industry in the United States
had been expanding over the preceding zo years. There was also evidence that in the
absence of capital expansion the company would have had to reduce its business activity
because of its inability to meet all of its orders. These and other factors led the
court to conclude that the expansion was justified. Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper
Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 299, 6o Ati. 941 (Ch. 1905).
'Whittemore v. Continental Mills, 98 F. Supp. 387 (D. Me. 195i). The court
was also influenced by the fact that extended expansion of the surplus might possibly
have subjected the corporation to a tax penalty.
A variation on the situation in the Whittemore case could occur where the
majority of the shares of a corporation are held by another corporation and a
minority of the shares are held by individuals in high income tax brackets. Should
the owning corporation wish to pressure the minority stockholders into selling their
shares, they could threaten to declare a very large dividend. Such a dividend would
operate to the detriment of the minority, since they would pay heavy income taxes on
the dividend, while the owning corporation would pay a maximum tax of 7.8% by
virtue of the favorable treatment accorded inter-corporate dividends. Cf. INT. RrV.
CODE OF 1954 § 243.
"T Crichton v. Webb Press Co., x13 La. 167, 36 So. 926 (904).
"
5 Flemming v. Heffner & Fleming, 263 Mich. 56x, 248 N.W. 9oo (1933).
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the minority will greatly increase the complainant's chance of success in
court.19
With regard to salaries, it should be noted that courts generally are
more receptive to complaints of unjustified compensation when the man-
agement is comprised of those who also control the selection of the
board of directors.20 Several tests have been employed to measure the
reasonableness of remuneration for such stockholders holding manage-
ment positions.2" Salaries are sometimes compared with those paid to
executives of other corporations engaged in the same type of business. 2
Compensation previously paid to the executive or his predecessor may
be examined,2 3 and if there has been a substantial increase, a court might
make further inquiry to determine whether there has been a propor-
tionate increase in duties and responsibilities24 or in corporate earnings.2 i
The salaries of members of the controlling group have also been com-
pared with those of other employees of the same corporation, due regard
being given to job differences.28
Once the protesting stockholder has convinced a court that it should
"o Cases are collected in Annot., 55 A.L.R. 8, 44, 133 (1928) ; Annot., 76 A.L.R.
885, 888 (1932).
' See Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 157 Minn. 46o, 189 N.W. 586
(1922); Mortimer v. D. T. McKeithan Lumber Corp., 127 S.C. 266, i±o S.E. 723
(1923).
"See generally, WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE
ExEcuTivE, ch. 15 (rev. ed. 195).
2Church v. Harnit, 35 F.zd 499 (6th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 732
(593o); Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924), appeal dismissed, 31
F.2d zoii (8th Cir. 1929); Stratis v. Andreson, 254 Mass. 536, 15o N.E. 832 (1926).
2 Barrows v. J. N. Fauver Co., 28o Mich. 553, 274 N.W. 325 (1937); Luyckx v.
R. L. Aylward Coal Co., 270 Mich. 468, 259 N.W. 135 (1935); Lillard v. Oil, Paint,
& Drug Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 197, 56 Ad. 254 (Ch. 1903); Raynolds v. Diamond Mills
Paper Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 299, 6o Atl. 941 (Ch. 1905).
2 See Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., supra note 23, where increases in
salaries for the president and secretary, from $12,000 to $15,ooo, and from $6,ooo to
$9,000, were held to be unreasonable, one reason being that there was no corresponding
increase in their duties.
" Francis v. Brigham-Hopkins Co., so8 Md. z33, 70 At. 95 (19o8) ; Esposito v.
Riverside Sand & Gravel Co., 287 Mass. 185, x91 N.E. 363 (1934); Seitz v. Union
Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., i5z Minn. 46o, 189 N.W. 586 (192). See Costello v. Thomas
Cusack Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 95, 124 Atl. 6zo (Ch. 1924), where the president was voted
a salary of $5oooo, an allowance of So,ooo for expenses, and a bonus of xo% of the
profits. It was held that this was not shown to be unreasonable because business had
increased from $2,000,000 to $4,000,000 each year.
"Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.zd 531 (D. Minn. 1924), appeal dismissed, 3x F.ad
ioii (8th Cir. 1929); Davids v. Davids, 135 App. Div. 2o6, 12o N.Y. Supp. 350
0909).
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thus intervene in the affairs of the corporation,27 several remedies are
available. One who has sold his stock at a sacrifice solely because divi-
dends have been withheld may be allowed to recover the difference be-
tween the sale price and the actual worth of his stock.28 A court of equity
can, of course, compel payment of a dividend, and one court went so
far as to retain jurisdiction over a case for five years to insure continuing
good faith compliance with such an order.2" Courts also have occasion-
ally placed even prosperous corporations in receivership where no other
adequate remedy was available." In North Carolina, a novel statutory
provision gives twenty per cent of the stockholders the right to compel
a dividend declaration of at least one-third of the current profits.3
Finally, a court has the power to adjust any unreasonable compensation.2
MERGER
A corporate merger (or consolidation) can also be used to freeze
out the minority stockholders or to alter the rights and preferences of
their share contract.3 It is well established that, in exchange for their
original shares, stockholders of an absorbed corporation may be given
stock of the surviving corporation with markedly different rights and
preferences, 3 4 the justification being that one who buys stock in a corpora-
"' It should be emphasized again at this point that the courts are reluctant to impose
their judgment upon the directors' discretion in the declaration of dividends. See
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 17o N.W. 668 (i9'9) 5 Connelly v. Weis-
feld, 142 N.J. Eq. 4o6, 59 A.zd 869 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948); Note, 64 HARv. L.
RE.v. 299 (1950).
"
8 Von Au v. Magenheimer, 126 App. Div. 257, io N.Y. Supp. 629 (1908).
"Patton v. Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.zd 848 (1955).
"' Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F.zd 817 (4th Cir.
1933).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(i) (Supp. 1957). "See cases in footnote 2s supra.
"See generally, 15 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7159 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1938) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]; 5 9 C.J.S., Corps. § 16iz (194o) Fuld,
Some Practical 4spects of .4 Merger, 6o HARV. L. REv. 1092 (i947) 1 Lattin, Remedies
of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REV. 233 (1931)i
Comment, 45 YALE L.J. io5 (1935).
" See Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 45 F. Supp. 436 (D. Del. 1942),
aff'd, 136 F.zd 944 ( 3 d Cir. 1943) i Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., 1o5 N.J. Eq.
621, 149 Atl. 36 (Ch. 1930 ) ; Adams v. United States Distributing Corp., 184 Va. 134 ,
34 S.E.2d 244, cert. denied, 327 U.S. 788 (1945).
It has been held that a provision in a stock certificate providing that a merger shall
not impair the rights and preferences of the stock is invalid when it conflicts with a
statute which permits merger agreements that include changes in the rights and prefer-
ences of stock. It is argued that such a statutory provision is evidence that it was never
intended that rights and preferences should not be altered in a merger. See Clarke v.
Gold Dust Corp., io6 F.2d 598 ( 3 d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 671 (1939).
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tion understands that his rights and preferences may be altered by the
action of a majority of shareholders."
The case of Matteson v. Ziebarth3 illustrates the devastating fashion
in which a merger may be used either to oust the minority stockholder or
to deprive him of his role in the management of the corporation. A
minority stockholder, invoking the common law rule, blocked a proposed
sale of all of the corporation's outstanding stock by refusing to consent
to the transaction.37 The majority stockholders then organized a dum-
my corporation, purchased all of its outstanding common stock, and
made themselves its directors. Shortly thereafter, by a two-thirds vote,
the stockholders of the original corporation approved a merger with
the dummy corporation under the terms of which each share of common
stock in the original corporation was to be exchanged for one share of
redeemable preferred stock of the dummy corporation, the apparent in-
tention being to redeem the stock of the dissenter. In sustaining the
merger against allegations of fraud and unfairness, the court relied on
the fact that the transaction was for a lawful business purpose. More-
over, the court felt that the dissenting shareholder was not actually in-
jured by the merger, since he had a right to have his shares appraised
and purchased by the corporation.
As demonstrated in Federal United Corporation v. Havender,8
merger can also be a potent device for erasing dividend arrearages,
especially when this effect cannot be achieved by charter amendment.3 "
"See Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.zd 331 (Sup. Ct.
1940), 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 614.
so 4o Wash. 286, 242 P.zd 1025 (,957).
"The Ziebarth Corporation was in failing circumstances. An agreement was made
with a larger corporation whereby it agreed to purchase all the outstanding Ziebarth
stock in exchange for its own stock. The dissenter objected to the plan because it called
for the purchasing corporation to hire the majority stockholder at a salary of $ i6,ooo for
8 months. The dissenting stockholder contended that part of this salary was in consid-
eration for the agreement to sell the stock. He argued that all of the stockholders
should share in this money and refused to consent to the plan. See also Outwater v.
Public Service Corp., io3 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 Atl. 729 (Ch. 1928).
824 Del. Ch. 38, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940), 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 614.
" See BALLANTINE § 296. In Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 45 F. Supp.
436 (D. Del. 1942), aff'd, x36 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. x943), the court upheld the elimina-
tion of accrued dividends by a merger with a wholly owned subsidiary which was
created for that purpose.
Thus, the holders of preferred shares with large dividend arrearages may find that
the result of the merger is to wipe out their arrearages and make possible the payment
of a dividend on the common stock from that future surplus from which they had
expected to draw their arrearages. See generally, Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27
Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.zd 148 (Ch. 1943); Donohue v. Heuser, 239 S.W.zd 238 (Ky.
[VOL, 1959: 436
MINORITY RIGHTS
There, the plaintiffs brought a bill in equity to declare void a proposed
merger of the defendant corporation with its wholly-owned subsidiary,
where the result would have been the elimination of accrued dividends
on the plaintiffs' stock. The merger was upheld on the ground that
the elimination of accrued dividends lay within the power of the corpora-
tion40 and on the reasoning that one who buys stock in a corporation
"must be held to know that dividends may accumulate on a preferred
stock, and that in the event of a merger of the corporation issuing the
stock with another corporation, the various rights of shareholders, in-
cluding the rights to dividends on preference stock accrued but unpaid,
may, and perhaps must, be the subject of reconcilement and adjust-
ment ..... 1141 The court also alluded to and may have been influenced
by the fact that the dissenting shareholder had the alternative of in-
voking an appraisal statute.
Modern corporation statutes, by facilitating fundamental corporate
changes, such as merger, have, incidentally, made it easier to victimize
minority interests. In mitigation of this danger, at least forty-two states
have adopted appraisal statutes designed to give some measure of pro-
tection to minority shareholders. 42  Theoretically, these statutes enable
1951 ) ; Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 3z5 Mich. 699, 39 N.W.2d 34.1 (1949) 5 Annot.,
8 A.L.R.2d 893 (1949) ; Becht, lterations of Accrued Dividends, 49 MICH. L. REv.
363, 565 (195x); Comment, 47 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1948); Note, 57 HARV. L. REV.
894 (1944)-
"' The court said: "The state has an interest in the corporate structures under its
authority. Having provided for the merger of corporations, they are not regarded with
disfavor. On the contrary, mergers are encouraged to the extent that they tend to con-
serve and promote corporate interests. . . . Moreover, it is recognized that there may
be shareholders who will be dissatisfied with the effect of the terms of the merger pro-
posal upon the rights attached to their shares. While their right to dissent is admitted,
the public policy of the state declared by the statute, somewhat analogous to the right
of eminent domain, does not permit a dissenting shareholder, as against an affirmative
vote of two-thirds, to veto a merger agreement if its terms are fair and equitable in
the circumstances of the case. . . . The broad contention advanced by the appellees,
that the merger provisions of the General Corporation Law do not authorize the ex-
tinguishment of dividends accumulated on preference stock, even if the terms of the
merger proposal are fair and equitable, must be denied. . . ." Federal United Corp. v.
Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 334-35, x A.7d 331, 338-39 (Sup. Ct. 1940), 25 WASH.
U. L. Q. 614.
"' Id. at 334, i A.2d at 338.
"With the virtual disappearance of 'vested rights,' and the almost limitless present-
day scope of charter amendment, a shareholder holds that bundle of rights that we call
his shares virtually at sufferance; votes of others may transform that bundle into one
utterly, perhaps shockingly, different." Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties in the
New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 363, 387 (195S).
'See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 12 Del. Ch. 142, 172 Ad. 452 (Ch. 1934), 19
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a stockholder who dissents from certain corporate actions to have his
stock appraised at a fair value and purchased by the corporation. 3 In
most jurisdictions this remedy is not exclusive;" the dissenter may per-
suade the court to enjoin or set aside the merger if he can prove that
the particular merger was illegal 5 or that it amounted to fraud.46 In
some states, however, the appraisal remedy is exclusive; 47 the dissenting
shareholder must acquiesce in the proposed merger or accept the ap-
praised value of his stock, although it is well known that appraisals some-
times fail to reflect the true worth of stock. The desirability of the
theory of nonexclusiveness is indicated by the fact that the apparent pur-
MINN. L. REv. 413. See generally, 15 Fletcher § 7r65; Annot., 87 A.L.R. 597
(1933); Annot., x6z A.L.R. 1237 (1946); Annot., 174 A.L.R. 96o (1948); Lattin,
Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HAV. L. REV. 233
(1931) ; Lattin, A Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes, 38 MIcH. L. REv. I165 (1940) ;
Levy, The Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, is CORNELL
L.Q. 420 (1930); Notes, 38 VA. L. REV. 915, 935 (1952); 6o YALE L.J. 337 (1951).
"See Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 12 Del. Ch. 142, 172 Atl. 452 (Ch. 1934), 19
MINN. L. REV. 473; In re Clark's Will, 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931); Adams
v. United States Distributing Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E.zd 244, cert. denied, 327
U.S. 788 (1945); Ballantine § 299; 15 Fletcher § 7165 n. 62; Robinson, Dissenting
Shareholders: Their Rights to Disidends and the Valuation of Their Shares, 32 COLUM.
L. RE'V. 6o (1932).
The dissenting shareholder may lose his appraisal rights by laches. National Sup-
ply Co. v. Leland Stanford Jr. University, 134 F.2d 689 ( 9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 773 (1943).
"Weiss v. Atkins, 52 F. Supp. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), rev'd on other grounds,
x49 F.zd 193 (2d Cir. 1945); Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., 79 Ohio App. 93, 72
N.E.zd 482 (1945) ; Dickinson v. Fire Ass'n, 378 Pa. 396, io6 A.zd 607 (1954).
"De Koven v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 216 Fed. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
"Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 199 Fed. 64, aff'd, 203 Fed. 945 (8th Cir.
1913) (holding that the minority can obtain relief where the distribution of stock re-
sulting from the merger is so unjust as to amount to a fraud upon the minority) ; Hot-
tenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 45 F. Supp. 436 (D. Del. 1942), aff'd, 136 F.2d 944
( 3 d Cir. 1943); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A.zd 148 (Ch.
1943); Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, is Del. Ch. 47, 156 At. 183 (Ch. 1931)
(holding that fraudulent undervaluation or overvaluation of property of one of the corpo-
rations in the merger is ground for relief); Armstrong v. Hayden, 126 Misc. 786, 214
N.Y. Supp. 747 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Wick v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 46 Ohio
App. 253, 188 N.E. 514 (1932).
"'California's appraisal statute expressly declares that appraisal is the exclusive
remedy of the stockholder. CAL. CORP. CODE § 4123 (West 1955). Other states have
accomplished the same result by judicial construction of the statute. Beloff v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.zd 561 (1949). See also, Hubbard v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 42 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Pa. 1941); Adams v. United States
Distributing Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E.2d 244, cert. denied, 327 U.S. 788 (-945).
The courts have justified this result by reasoning that the shareholder has only the right
tn protect his monetary interest and has no right to continue in the business.
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pose of the appraisal statutes is to provide dissenters with a remedy
which would not otherwise exist when the majority attempts a prejudicial
fundamental corporate change, rather than to deprive them of those
remedies which, even in the absence of the appraisal statutes, they
would have against irregular, illegal, or fraudulent actions of the ma-
jority.48
Since the majority interests can easily comply with the terms of state
merger statutes, however, the shareholder who wishes to prevent the
merger usually must prove what most courts label "fraud," a term which
defies uniform definition. While some courts state that they will in-
quire into the unfairness of a merger agreement if particular circum-
stances seem to warrant dose scrutiny,49 others will set aside mergers
only when unfairness is so patent as unmistakably to indicate bad faith
or reckless indifference to the rights of the minority50 And some cases
can be found which base the invalidation of mergers on "constructive
fraud."" These nebulous phrases seem to require some conduct ap-
'8 STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § i28, at 591-97 (1949). See also, Craddock-
Terry Co. v. Powell, i3 Va. 417, 25 S.E.2d 363 (x93) ; Note, 41 YALE L.J. 908
(1932).
"' The fact that the merging corporations were governed by interlocking directors
will not necessarily result in upsetting the merger, but such a situation calls for close
scrutiny. Bingham v. Savings Investment & Trust Co., ioz N.J. Eq. 413, 138 Atl. 659
(Ch. 1927)i Wilson v. Rensselaer & S. R.R., 184 Misc. 218, 52 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup.
Ct. 1945).
" "[T]he unfairness must be of such character and must be so clearly demonstrated
as to impel the conclusion that it emanates from acts of bad faith, or a reckless indiffer-
ence to the rights of others interested, rather than from an honest error of judgment."
Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 133, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (Ch. 1943).
See Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del.), aff'd 146 F.2d 701
( 3 d Cir. 1944); MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., P F. Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943) ;
Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 Pac. 1044 (1928);
MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 157 At. 396 (Ch.
1928) 5 Outwater v. Public Service Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 Atl. 729 (Ch. 1928).
"The exercise of the statutory power of merger or consolidation is not usually sub-
jected to judicial review on the ground of mere unfairness in valuation. There are,
however, some judicial opinions which use general language about fairness and unfair-
ness. . . . But there seems no tendency in the decisions toward adopting any fairness
limitation. The courts are reluctant to review relative values in merger or consolida-
tion plans. . . . Widest scope is allowed to business discretion and decisions of the
majority." BALLANTINE § 295, at 692.
51Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del.), aff'd, 146 F.2d
701 (3d Cir. 1944)5 Krantman v. Liberty Loan Corp., 152 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. I11.
1956), ,ff'd, 246 F.2d 581 (7 th Cir. 1957) (holding that a merger, which had re-
ceived the necessary two-thirds vote of the stockholders, would be presumed to be fair
and reasonable and could not be successfully attacked by the dissenters unless they could
prove actual or constructive fraud) i MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F. Supp.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
proaching fraud, but beyond that they offer very little in the way of con-
crete guidance in particular cases. There is, moreover, some indication
that certain courts, through the stated requirement of fraud, mean to
impose a more rigorous burden of proof on the protesting stockholder
when a merger is involved than in other cases of corporate squeeze.
Thus, while the prevalence of appraisal statutes assures most dissenting
shareholders that their shares will be purchased by the corporation if
they choose, there remains slight chance under present law that they
will successfully resist any effort completely to deprive them of partici-
pation in a going business.
SALE OF AssETs
The common law rule which required a unanimous stockholder vote
for a sale of all the assets3 2 of a going concern 3 may have given the mi-
nority shareholder disproportionate protection. At least from the stand-
point of practical business considerations, it is fortunate that this onerous
rule has everywhere been superseded by statutes which permit a sale of
the corporation's assets upon the approval of a specified majority of the
stockholders. 4  These statutes, however, also create an opportunity,
462 (D. Del. 1943)5 Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 325 Mich. 699, 39 N.W.zd 341
(1949).
"A sale of assets was originally intended as a means whereby the corporation might
sell all its property for the purpose of liquidation and dissolution, but it has become
an important reorganization device, and it is now used in many instances to carry on
the business under a different corporate arrangement. See generally, BALLANTINE § 279;
x5 FLETCHER § 72z65 Hills, Consolidation of Corporations by Sale of Assets and
Distribution of Shares, i9 CALIF. L. REV. 349 (1931); Comment, 45 MICH. L. REv.
34 (947) i Note, 58 COLUM. L. RET. zsi (1958).
There have been instances in which the courts have set aside a sale of assets when the
purpose of the sale was to obtain an end not contemplated by the sale of assets statute.
See, e.g., Finch v. Warrior Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 44, T41 Atl. 54 (Ch. 1928) (in-
volving an intended reorganization via a sale of assets).
"lDes Moines Life & Annuity Co. v. Midland Ins. Co., 6 F.ad 228 (D. Minn.
1925) 5 Gottschalk v. Avalon Realty Co., 249 Wis. 78, 23 N.W.2d 6o6 (1946). The
reasoning behind this rule was to the effect that each stockholder had a contractual right
to have the corporation continue during its existence the purposes for which it was
created. See Des Moines Life & Annuity Co. v. Midland Ins. Co., supra. For criticism
of this rule, see BALLANTINE § 281.
If, however, the corporation was in a failing condition, the common law rule
permitted the majority to sell the assets over the objection of the minority. Geddes v.
Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921).
"See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § zi (McKinney 1951); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 8623-72 (Page 1954). See also Solorza v. Park Water Co., 86 Cal. App. zd
653, 195 P.zd 523 (1948) 5 Garbarino v. Albercan Oil Corp., - Del. Ch. -, To9 A.2d
824 (1954).,
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similar to that offered by a merger, for the majority unfairly to exercise
its power at the expense of the minority. For example, the majority
shareholders of corporation A, who own shares, in corporation B, can
authorize a sale of all of corporation A's assets to corporation B. In ex-
change, the stock of corporation B might then be issued to corporation A,
which subsequently would liquidate by issuing B stock to its stockholders
in return for their A shares.', And the unwanted minority stockholder
may find to his dismay that the B stock is quite different from his former
stock in corporation A.
In most states, appraisal statutes are available to dissenters in a sale-
of-assets situation, too;5 6 and where such statutes are not deemed to
afford the exclusive remedy,57 the complaining minority may obtain
equitable relief if the degree of proof, whatever it is, required to make
out a case of fraud5" is satisfied.
" The corporation can usually sell its assets for shares in the purchasing corporation
or for money. In the event that the sale is for shares of stock in the purchaser, however,
it has been held that the stockholder cannot be forced to accept the shares of the
purchaser in exchange for his shares. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254
U.S. 590 (1921); American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 290 Fed. 896 (6th Cir. 1923) ;
Finch v. Warrior Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 44, 141 At. 54 (Ch. 1928). Cf. Tread-
well v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 7 Gray (73 Mass.) 393 (1856). An exception to this rule
has been recognized where the shares received by the corporation from the purchaser are
of such an established market value that they can readily be converted to cash and are
thus the equivalent of cash. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., supra; Ringler
v. Atlas Portland Cement Co., 301 Pa. 176, 151 Atl. 8i5 (1930). Cf. Craddock-Terry
v. Powell, 181 Va. 417, 25 S.E.2d 363 (1943).
50See, e.g., N.Y. STocK Coai. LAw § 21 (McKinney 1951)j OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 8623-72 (Page 1954). See also Note, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 25i, 253-56 (1958).
" In a few instances the statutes expressly declare that the appraisal rights are ex-
clusive in a sale situation. See Note, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 251, 254. & n. 15 (1958). In
other situations, the courts have construed the appraisal statutes as the exclusive remedy
of the dissenter is a sale of assets. See, e.g., Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300
N.Y. 1', 87 N.E.2d 561 (r949). The better rule, however, is that appraisal rights in
a sale situation are exclusive only if there are no grounds for the court to impose
equitable limitations upon the act of the majority. 13 FLETCHER § 5893-
" See Crawford v. Mexican Petroleum Co., 13o F.2d 359 (zd Cir. 1942) i May v.
Midwest Refining Co., 121 F.2d 431 (st Cir. 1941) 5 Wechler v. Valley City Mill Co.,
93 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Mich. 1950) ; Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp.
198 (D. Del.), ar'd, 146 F.2d 701 ( 3 d Cir. 1944); Starrett Corp. v. Fifth Ave. &
Twenty-Ninth St. Corp., i F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) 5 Allaun v. Consolidated Oil
Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 At. 257 (Ch. 1929) 5 Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel &
Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. 11, 12o Ad. 486 (1923); Note, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
251, 256 & n. 30 (x958).
The fact that there is disagreement over what amounts to fraud is nowhere better
illustrated than in the notable opinion of District Judge Leahy in Barrett v. Denver
Tramway Corp., supra.
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Certain factors do seem to have received more frequent judicial con-
sideration in sale-of-assets cases. " Proof that the sole motive in making
the sale was to eliminate the complaining stockholder from the corpora-
tion has been held sufficient to warrant equitable relief.60 Although,
standing alone, it has not been recognized as a ground for relief, in-
adequacy of consideration, too, usually has weighed in the dissenter's
favor. 1 Likewise, the fact that the majority owns an interest in the
purchasing corporation has received the serious attention of the courts. 2
ISSUANCE OF STOCK
The corporate squeeze has been successfully applied through the
sale of treasury stock, authorized but unissued stock, or newly author-
ized stock. The usual technique is to reduce the minority's proportionate
"See generally, BALLANTINE § 2,85; 13 FLETCHER § 58475 Stevens, PRIVATE
COR'ORATIONS § x26 0949).
"0 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.s. 483 (i9ig); Welt v. Beachcomber,
Inc., 166 Misc. 29, 1 N.Y.Szd 177 (Sup. Ct. -937).
a' In a sale of assets the majority owes the minority a duty of seeing that the
assets are sold for an adequate price. Kaye v. Kentucky Public Elevator Co., 295 Ky.
661, 175 S.W.zd 142 (1943). The adequacy of the price received for the assets is a
frequent point of contention when the minority seeks to set aside the sale. It has been
held that the sale is voidable if it is made for a wholly inadequate consideration, that
is, when the consideration is so inadequate as to amount to fraud. Allaun v. Con-
solidated Oil Co., x6 Del. Ch. 318, 147 AtI. 257 (Ch. 1929) ; Allied Chem. & Dye Corp.
v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. x, 12o Ad. 486 (Ch. xgz3).
However, simple inadequacy of price, absent other decisive factors, is not a ground
for upsetting the sale upon suit by the minority. See Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal
Co., x55 Md. 66, 141 Adt. 425 (1928); Koehler v. St. Mary's Brewing Co., 228 Pa.
648, 77 Ati. xo16 (i91o). It has been stated that there is a presumption that the
majority will obtain an adequate price for the assets because they will also lose if the
price is inadequate. See Note, 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 251, 257 & n. 36 (1958). The
reason for the courts' reluctance to inquire into the adequacy of the consideration is
said to be the feeling that they are "controlled by the policy of giving directors and
majority shareholders a wide business discretion in matters of contract and corporate
management. The courts hesitate to substitute their judgment for that of the parties
concerned in matters of business." BALLANTINE § 285, at 673. See also 13 FLETCHER
§ 5837.
For a discussion of the elements of value to be considered in the sale, see generally,
13 FLETCHER § 5899.
"' "The presumption in favor of the fiduciary fails when, because of the relationship
between him and the purchaser, his responsibilities to the corporation might be subordi-
nated to his private interest in the sale. In such situations, the fiduciary, by making
a sale for terms inequitable to the vendor, might gain special advantages, and the
courts will scrutinize the sale carefully for unfairness." Note, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 251,
258 (1958). See Annot., 24 A.L.R.zd 71 (x952). See also Geddes v. Anaconda
Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921) (where the vendor corporation and pur-
chasing corporation had a common director).
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interest in the corporation either by issuing stock at less than fair market
value, without offering any of the shares to the minority group, or by
issuing stock at a time when the minority is finanically unable to pur-
chase its proportionate part of the issue. By buying large quantities of
such stock, the majority can acquire increased voting power in the
corporation and, concurrently, can dilute the minority's interest in any
corporate surplus.s
Prompted by a belief that stockholders should have some measure
of protection against the adverse effects of an issuance of additional stock,
the courts early developed the theory of pre-emptive rights. 4 A pre-
emptive right usually entitles its possessor to subscribe to new issues in
" See Hyman v. Velsicol, 342 111. App. 489, 97 N.E.zd 122 (1951).
, The doctrine of pre-emptive rights is uusually said to have developed from the
case of Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 363 (1807). See Ross Transport, Inc., v.
Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.zd 267 (1946). See generally, Gibbons v. Mahon, 136
U.S. 549 (89o) ; Borg v. International Silver Co., ii F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1925) ; Ham-
mer v. Werner, 239 App. Div. 38, 265 N.Y. Supp. 172 (1933). This is said to be
a right of which the directors or majority cannot deprive the stockholder. "The
directors' duty in issuing new shares was to afford to the existing stockholders an
opportunity to take the proposed new issue in the proportion in which the shares were
held by them. In many cases corporations are incorporated, capitalized and organized
by stockholders upon expectations based upon the maintenance of control by the existing
majority of the holders of stock. The power of distributing a new issue does not lie
at the mere choice of directors. It is not a perquisite which they may use for their
private advantage. They may not overthrow or secure for themselves the control of
the corporation by means of a new issue of stock." Way v. American Grease Co., 6o
N.J. Eq. 263, 269, 47 Atl. 44, 46 (Ch. xgoo). The stockholder can waive his pre-
emptive rights, but, with certain exceptions, he cannot be deprived of his right unless
he consents. Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 17o N.E. 917
(1930) ; x1 FLETCHER § 5139.
It should be noted that, as a practical matter, pre-emptive rights are of slight sig-
nificance in large public-issue corporations. "The common law doctrine has proved
too uncertain when applied to a complex stock structure; and application of the doc-
trine might hamper legitimate corporate financing." ii FLETCHER § 5135, at 282.
But cf. Venner v. Southern Pac. Co., 279 Fed. 832 (2d Cir. 1922). In the dose
corporation, however, pre-emptive rights are of the utmost importance to the share-
holders if they are to protect their proportionate interest in the corporation. See
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 4.29, 8.og (1958) i BALLANTINE, LAITIN, & JEN-
NINGS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 675 (2d ed. 1953).
Some states regard pre-emptive rights as wholly statutory in nature. See, e.g.,
Bingham v. Savings Investment & Trust Co., 102 N.J. Eq. 3oz, 14o Atl. 321 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1928); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. 82, 90 A.2d 66o (1952).
In other states the right does not depend upon any statutory or charter provisions, but
is inherent in the ownership of stock. See, e.g., In re McCrory Stores Corp., 14 F.
Supp. 739, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Schramme v. Cowin, 205 App. Div. 20, 199 N.Y.
Supp. 98 (1923). Charter provisions sometimes regulate the right. See, e.g., CAL.
COPP. CODE § 11o6 (West. 1955).
proportion to his existing holding of outstanding stock in the corpora-
tion,q5 and the fact that these rights normally do not apply to nonvoting
stock indicates that their primary purpose is to protect the shareholder's
voice in the corporate management. 6
For a variety of reasons, many states have engrafted limitations on
the pre-emptive rights doctrine. 7  In some states, the corporate charter
determines whether and to what extent stockholders may enjoy pre-
emptive rights.6 8  Furthermore, although these rights may exist, the
majority sometimes has the power to eliminate them by charter amend-
ment. 9 Thus, it becomes important to determine when pre-emptive
rights exist, for to the extent that they are restricted, the chances of a
successful squeeze increase.70
Even where pre-emptive rights are relatively unimpaired by statute,
however, several exceptions have sliced into the protection they afford.
First, it is usually held that no pre-emptive rights attach to stock issued
in exchange for property.7' This exception is obviously necessary, for
desirable property is frequently obtainable only in exchange for a bloc
of the acquiring corporation's stock. However, it would seem sensible
to limit the exception to situations in which exercise of the pre-emptive
right would unduly impede the fulfillment of transactions undertaken
for legitimate business reasons.
"lSee Thorn v. Baltimore Trust Co., 158 Md. 352, 148 Ad. 234 (930), 39 YALE
L.J. 905; Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W.2d 62o (1946); Hammer
v. Cash, 172 Wis. 185, 178 N.W. 465 (920); II FLETCHER § 5135 at z85 & n. 46.
"d See Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 3+ F.2d 533 (D.R.I. 1929); Frey,
Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J. 563 (1929). But it has occasionally
been held that the right extends to preferred stock. See Tennant v. Epstein, 275 Il1. App.
2o4, rev'd on other grounds, 356 Ill. 26, 589 N.E. 864 0934). See also BALLANTINE
§ 209.
" It has been pointed out that the doctrine is becoming more limited because it is
not adaptable to the complex corporate stock structures of today, esepcially in corpora-
tions with numerous classes of stock. See Drinker, The Pre-Emptive Right of Share-
holders to Subscribe to New Shares, 43 HARy. L. REv. 586, 6o5 (1930); Frey, Share-
holders' Pre-Emptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J. 563 (9±9).
08See, e.g., CAL. CoRPi. CODE § i o6 (West 1955); N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW, § 39
(McKinney 19px); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.15 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. .8, § 1.,5 (perm. ed. 1953); WIs. STAT. § 8o.21 (1955).
09See, e.g., Milwaukee Sanitarium v. Swift, 238 Wis. 628, 3oo N.W. 76o (941).
"oSee, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 862 3 - 3 5 (d) (Page 1954).
"' One of the leading cases in Thorn v. Baltimore Trust Co., xs8 Md. 352, 548 Ad.
234 (1930), 39 YALE L.J. 9o5 (1929), where the court reasoned that the pre-emptive
right existed only if it could be exercised consistently with the object which the stock
issue was designed to accomplish. See also Meredith v. New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co.,
55 N.J. Eq. 21x, 37 Ati. 539 (Ch. 1897). This exception has been severely criticized.
Frey, Shareholders' Pre-Emptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J. 563, 579 (.929).
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Secondly, pre-emptive rights generally do not attach to originally
authorized but unissued stock. 2 The reasoning here is that stockholders
understand that the corporation is free to issue all authorized shares
before pre-emptive rights become operative.73 But there is an exception
to the exception, in that pre-emptive rights will attach where the pur-
pose of the issue is expansion of the business.74 If, however, the stock
is issued to secure capital to carry on the normal business operations, no
pre-emptive right exists."' One qualification of particular help to
minority stockholders is that authorized but unissued stock cannot be
issued by the directors to themselves in order to gain or perpetuate con,
trol.76
There is also authority to the effect that no pre-emptive rights
attach to the issuance of treasury stock. 77 The exception is grounded
in the notion that the issuance of such re-acquired stock does not reduce
the stockholder's original proportionate interest in the business.7" How-
ever, such a viewpoint disregards the fact that an issuance of treasury
stock may impair the stockholder's newly acquired position, a result
especially unjustifiable if the stockholder purchased his interest after re-
demption and before re-issuance of the stock. A more serious criticism
of this particular exception is that it offers yet another method for
freezing out minority stockholders through redemption of the shares
of some stockholders and re-issuance to the majority, thereby increasing
the control margin of the latter group.79
7' Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (Ch. 1941), 4o MICH. L. REV.
125 (xg4x); Ross Transport, Inc. v. Crothers, x85 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946)5
Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 17o N.E. 927 (1930).
" Ross Transport, Inc. v. Crothers and Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co.,
supra note 72. See also, Drinker, The Pre-Emptive Right of Shareholders to Susbcribe
to New Shares, 43 HA.V. L. REV. 586 (930).
"'See Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.zd 309 (Ch. 1941), 40 MICH.
L. REv. ixi Essex v. Essex, 141 Mich. zoo, 104 N.W. 62z (905) 5 Dunlay v.
Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 27o N.E. 917 (2930).
7 See cases cited at note 74 supra.
" Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson Mach. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 P.2d 1z68 (936)5
Canada Southern Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi Exploration Co., 33 Del. Ch. 537, 96 A.zd 8xo
(Ch. 2953).
"Borg v. International Silver Co., 22 F.zd 147 (2d Cir. 1925).
Fletcher reasons that the exception is based on practical grounds of convenience
in that treasury shares "are usually sold from time to time and are not reissued in large
amounts." xi FLETCHER § 5136.z at 297-98. Crosby v. Stratton, 17 Colo. App. 212,
68 Pac. 230 (2902).
"Dunn v. Acme Auto & Garage Co., x68 Wis. 128, 169 N.W. 297 (1918).
In Runswick v. Floor, x6 Utah 91, 208 P.zd 948 (1949), about 1,000,000 shares
were outstanding when x5o,ooo treasury shares were issued to a director, who was a
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Finally, pre-emptive rights are not recognized in favor of holders
of bonds which can be converted into voting stock until such bonds are
actually converted.80 Generally, neither shares having potential voting
rights, such as preferred shares which obtain voting privileges only after
a period of default in dividends, 1 nor shares which are soon to lose
their voting incidents can claim pre-emptive rights. 2
Although the judicial and legislative restrictions upon the doctrine
of pre-emptive rights may have reasonable justification in terms of
corporate policy, it is evident that they make it less difficult to squeeze
the minority group. If the minority stockholder has no pre-emptive
right, or is financially unable to exercise his right, he must seek judicial
enforcement of the fiduciary obligations of the directors and majority
stockholders and, ultimately confront all of the attendant difficulties of
proof."
STOCK DIVIDENDS
Majority interests can sometimes increase their measure of control
by paying a dividend in stock of another class to their own class of
stock. 4 For example, if the majority stockholders wished to dilute the
interest or reduce the voting strength of holders of, say, class B com-
mon stock, and if there were a substantial number of authorized but
unissued shares of class B common stock, the majority could declare
a dividend in class B common stock on their own stock. 5 Confronted
with such a course of action, the original holders of class B common stock
might deem it wiser to sell their stock than to remain and suffer further
dilution.
Most states authorize dividends to one class of stock paid in shares
of another class, and in those states where such a dividend is not ex-
pressly recognized, a provision in the corporate charter can often supply
member of the group controlling the corporation at the time. The court held that the
stockholders had no pre-emptive right in the treasury stock.
"
0 Van Slyke v. Norris, 559 Minn. 63, 198 N.W. 409 (1924).
" See Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.zd 533 (D. R.I. 1929)
(dictum).
"See Frey, Shareholders Pre-emptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J. 563, 578 (5929).
83See BALLATrINE § zo2; Annot., 138 A.L.R. 526 (1942).
' Cf. Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., x5 Del. Ch. x9, 13Z, Atl. 44 (Ch.
1926).
' Ballantine criticizes the power of directors in some states to declare a dividend on
common stock in the preferred shares. He argues that such a dividend has the effect
of prejudicing the relative rights of the shareholders. BALLANTINE § 20(b). See
Rowell, Rights of Preferred Shareholders in Excess of Preference, 19 MINN. L. REV.
406, 410 (935).
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validation."' Only a few states, such as North Carolina, afford the pro-
tection of requiring that the directors obtain annual authorization for
a stock dividend from the class adversely affected . 7  In the absence of
such a safeguard, however, the minority stockholder must, again, attempt
to establish a violation of the majority's fiduciary obligation in order to
prevent the declaration of a stock dividend. And the difficulty inherent
in proving a sole purpose to squeeze out the minority is compounded
here by the discretion accorded directors in declaring dividends8 and
by the customary reluctance of the courts to interfere in management
affairs.89
BANKRUPTCY
Another unique freeze-out device is the filing of a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy with the intent of outbidding the minority interests at the
bankruptcy sale. An excellent illustration of the use of this tactic is
afforded in Porterfield v. Gerstel, ° where the majority directors were
alleged to have committed acts, within a month after securing control,
designed to give a prospering corporation the appearance of inability to
meet its obligations. The alleged purpose of this strategem was to
bring about a bankruptcy sale at which the majority could purchase the
corporate assets, thereby eliminating the minority from the corporation.
On appeal, it was held that bankruptcy proceedings could not be used
to perpetrate a fraud upon the minority.
The minority stockholders' success in preventing the carrying out
of such a scheme will ultimately depend, then, upon their ability to
prove that the voluntary petition was filed in a fraudulent attempt either
to oust them from the corporation or otherwise unduly to prejudice
their interests. Significant in situations of this type would be evidence
showing whether the corporation's assets exceeded its liabilities, whether
the corporation could meet its obligations as they came due, whether
creditors were pressing for payment of their debts at the time of the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, the past relationship between majority
" See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.33 (Page Supp. .958) ; VA. CODE ANN.
§ '3.1-43 (1956)5 Wis. STAT. § 180.38 (1955).
87 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-5! (Supp. -957).
"See Schell v. Alston Mfg. Co., 149 Fed. 439 (N.D. Ill. 19o6); Williams v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 93 N.Y. 16z (1883). Their action will not be interfered with
so long as they have acted in good faith. Schmitt v. Eagle Roller Mill Co., 199 Minn.
382, 272 N.W. 277 (1937).
" See Connelly v. Weisfield, 142 N.J. Eq. 406, 59 A.zd 869 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
00 222 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1955).
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and minority, and any acts of mismanagement which the majority di-
rectors may have committed.
CHARTER AMENDMENTS
Since the Dartmouth College case,9" the shareholder's interest has
traditionally been considered contractual in nature, and the rights, priv-
ileges, and responsibilities conferred upon the shareholder by this con-
tract determine, to a great extent, the value of the stockholder's interest
in the corporation. Thus, the majority can often achieve a desired
end by altering the terms of this contract.
The most obvious device for increasing the worth of one class of
stock at the expense of another is amendment of the dividend provision
of the share contract. Although in some jurisdictions it is questionable
whether accrued dividends can be eliminated without consent, 2 future
dividend rights generally can be altered downward.03 Thus, future
dividend rates can be lowered and cumulative shares can be made non-
cumulative94 by any group controlling enough votes to amend the
charter.
A significant element of the shareholder's contract is the voting right
which he originally acquires. Although the elimination or alteration of
voting incidents is not permitted in many states, some jurisdictions have
upheld charter amendments which abrogate cumulative voting rights,",
eliminate the right of preferred stock to vote when dividend payments
"Dartmouth College v. Woodward, x7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (i819).
"In Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 262, 197 Atl. 489 (Ch.
1937), the defendant corporation adopted an amendment to its certificate of incorpora-
tion which provided that existing preferred stock, on which there were accrued and
unpaid dividends, were to be exchanged for preferred stock entitled to a lower dividend
rate. It was held that the corporation could not force the stockholder to forfeit his
rights to accrued dividends. The court pointed out that the corporation had the power
to change the character of his stocki but he did not take it with notice that the corpora-
tion could cancel his right to accrued dividends. See also Morris v. American Public
Utilities Co., x4 Del. Ch. 136, I:= Atl. 696 (Ch. 1923); Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., 147
Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E.2d 187 (1946); Note, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 586 (1947); Note, x8
U. CINN. L. REV. 172 (x949). Some states have statutes which expressly authorize the
elimination of accrued dividends by charter amendment. See, e.g., Ohio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 17o1.x7(i) (Page 1954).
"In Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 14z Alt. 654 (Ch.
1928), the charter amendment decreased the future dividend rate. The court held that
this was permissible under the reserved power. See BALLANTINE, LArrIN & JENNINGS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 981 (2d ed. 1953).
",See Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.2d 533 (D. R.I. 1929).
9"See Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl. 255 (Ch. x9±9). But
see Loewenthal v. Rubber Reclaiming Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 440, ±8 Atl. 454 (Ch. 1894).
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are in arrears,18 or transfer voting rights from common to preferred
stock0 7
Similarly, charter amendments have been upheld which made non-
redeemable shares redeemable,"' altered or abolished pre-emptive
rights,9 or made nonassessable shares assessable. 10 Any of these
techniques could be effectively employed adversely to affect minority
interests.
Another efficient device is the creation, through charter amendment,
of a class of prior preferred stock, coupled with an option in the holders
of the original preferred stock to exchange their old shares for the new
ones.1°1 The preferred stockholders will probably be reluctant to fore-
go the dividend priority of the new preferred shares, although valuable
incidents of the old shares will be lost in the exchange.
While it is evident that the possibilities for use of charter amend-
ments to harrass minority interests are numerous, the minority stock-
holder is not helpless when faced with an unfavorable amendment.
He may yet block the amendment if he can show that the proposed
change cannot be made under the terms of the share contract, that the
statute authorizing the amendment is unconstitutional, or that the ma-
"o See Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.2d 533 (D. R.I. i929).
"'See Topkis v. Delaware Hardware Co., 23 Del. Ch. iz5, 2 A.zd 114 (Ch. 1938).
For representative statutes dealing with the subject of alteration of voting rights by
charter amendment, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 3634 (West 1955); N.Y. STOCK CORP.
LAW § 35 (McKinney 2951). See also Note, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1368 (1941).
08In Cowan v. Salt Lake Hardware Co., i18 Utah 300, 222 P.zd 625 (195o), the
court sustained a charter amendment making non-redeemable shares redeemable. How-
ever, one factor weighing heavily in this case was the fact that the charter would expire
in 5 months, which the court used to counter allegations of unfairness. Cf. Beloff v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d s61 (i949). But in Breslav v. New
York & Queens Elec. Light & Power Co., 249 App. Div. 181, 291 N.Y. Supp. 932
(1936), afj'd, 273 N.Y. 593, 7 N.E.zd 708 (1937), the court held that the corporation
could not convert nonredeemable shares to redeemable shares under statutory authority
to "classify and reclassify" the shares of the corporation. See also Outwater v. Public
Service Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 Atl. 729 (Ch. 1928), aff'd, io4 N.J. Eq. 49o,
146 Atl. 916 (Ct. Err. & App. 2929).
"' See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 9o A.zd 66o (Sup. Ct. Del. i952)
Milwaukee Sanitarium v. Swift, 238 Wis. 6z8, 3oo N.W. 76o (194.i). New York ex-
pressly authorizes the elimination of pre-emptive rights by charter amendment. N.Y.
STOCK CORP. LAW § 35 (McKinney 1952).
'" Someville v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464
(1912).
... See Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 298 (D. Del. 1943)
, 
aff'd,
146 F.2d 701 ( 3 d Cir. 1944); Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp., 25 Del. Ch.
371 , 19 A.zd 831 (Ch. i94i) ; Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N.E.2d
127 (938).
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jority has violated its fiduciary duty to the minority."0 2 A few states
also give stockholders the protection of appraisal statutes if certain
fundamentally prejudicial charter amendments are adopted in spite of
their objections." 3
It is seldom easy, however, to determine precisely what the share
contract provides, for it normally encompasses the corporate charter and
by-laws as well as certain mandatory statutory provisions'0 imposed by
state of incorporation. Upon establishing the various elements of the
share contract, the stockholder may challenge a proposed amendment
not only on the ground that there is no authority in the contract for
such an amendment, but also on the ground that all of the formalities
required by the contract for passage of an amendment have not been
observed, or that the amendment in question is prohibited by a specific
provision in the contract.
The constitutionality of a charter amendment is usually challenged
when it was authorized by a statute enacted subsequent to the date on
which the corporation was chartered."0 5 Such statutes are upheld only
if they are within the purview of a state's reserved power clause, a con-
stitutional proviso retaining for the state the power statutorily to alter
or repeal charters of domestic corporations. 06 Arguments that certain
types of legislation cannot be applied retroactively to existing corpora-
tions are traditionally based on the contract and due process clauses of
the federal and state constitutions. Thus, it is urged that under the
contract clause, the reserved power can permit alterations only in cases
involving a public interest sufficient to justify action under the state's
police power.10T A due process argument may be made to the effect
... In discussing the protection of the minority in charter amendment situations,
Ballantine has said: "All powers granted to a corporation and its directors and majority
shareholders are impliedly to be exercised . . . only in good faith and for legitimate
purposes." BALLANTINE § 278 at 655, citing Small v. Sullivan, 245 N.Y. 343, 157
N.E. 261 (x917).
... See BALLANTINE, LArrnN & JENNINGS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA-
TIONS 102z n. 2 (2d ed. 1953).
.O, In order to be considered a part of the share contract of each domestic corpora-
tion, a statute must be mandatory. That is, it must be felt that the statute was enacted
for the protection of the public or classes of persons in the corporation that the legisla-
ture believes need special protection.
.. See Wilson v. Cherokee Drift Mining Co., z4 Cal. 2d 56, 92 P.zd Soz (1939);
Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. I , 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949); Harbine v.
Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 61 Ohio App. x, 22 N.E.2d 281 (1939).
1o See BALLANTINE, §§ 275-76.
'"o See Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.zd 533 (D. R.I. t929);
Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y.R.R., IS N.J. Eq. 178 (1867); Yukon Mill & Grain
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that reserved power clauses do not permit the destruction of property
rights of stockholders which are "vested. " lS Both of these theories are
currently receiving scant judicial attention, at least in the more im-
portant commercial states, the present tendency of the courts being to
construe reserved power clauses liberally, so as to allow greater legisla-
tive freedom in the application of statutes to previously chartered
corporations. °9
Should none of the above remedies be available or prove feasible,
the dissenter may successfully bring an action in equity to enjoin treat-
ment he considers unfair.1 ' But, as in the situations previously dis-
cussed, courts exhibit their varied dispositions toward granting equitable
relief in the different tests and degrees of proof which they require in
particular cases: For example, cases involving impairment of the
minority's right to vote are occasionally treated differently than cases
involving other types of charter amendments, since some courts will not
consider the unfariness of a voting amendment in the absence of fraud."'
CONCLUSION
The methods available to majority interests to take advantage of
minority stockholders are so numerous and so effective that there is often
little a stockholder can do, especially in a close corporation, adequately
to protect himself. Any solution to this problem must avoid the pitfall
of imposing major limitations on the control group in a dose corporation,
lest the substantial powers necessary for effective operation of a business
be unduly hampered. It should also be recognized that, in many in-
stances, the stockholder's miseries are compouided because he fails to
utilize effectively the remedies which are available to him, rather than
because remedies do not exist. An alert stockholder, acting under the
advice of counsel, can often, by careful preservation of evidence and
intelligent reliance on recognized legal and equitable remedies, do a
Co. v. Vose, 2ox Okla. 376, 2o6 P.2d 206 (1949)5 Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32
Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369 (1907); State ex rel. Swanson v. Perham, 30 Wash. 2d 368,
191 P.2d 689 (1948).
... See Consolidated Film Indust., Inc. v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 401, 197 Atl. 489
(Ch. x937); Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 39x, 19o Ad. 115 (Ch. 1936) ; In re
Mt. Sinai Hospital, 25o N.Y. 103, 164 N.E. 87, (1928) 5 Roberts v. Robert Wicks Co.,
184 N.Y. 257, 77 N.E. 13 (19o6).
'00 See Davis Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 AtI. 654 (Ch. 1928);
McNulty v. W.&J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1946) 5 Note,
37 CORNELL L.Q. 768, 772 & n. 24 (1952).
110 See note 104 supr.
" See Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Adt. 255 (Ch. 1929).
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great deal toward protecting himself. Nevertheless, there are a number
of reasonable statutory changes which could profitably be made in many
states to afford the minority stockholder in a close corporation more
adequate protection.
r. Perhaps the most helpful contribution in this area of the law
would be a stautory modification of the tests now employed by the
courts in deciding whether to grant equitable relief. By requiring only
a showing of unfairness under all the circumstances in all instances of
minority challenge to majority action, relief would be more readily
obtainable than is presently the case in those situations where some sort
of fraud must be proved.112 In addition, much of the present confusion
occasioned by the interchanging of inherently vague standards could be
eliminated by uniform statutory acceptance of the criterion of unfair-
ness. A statute adequate to satisfy most cases might declare that, pro-
vided the complaining stockholder can establish substantial detriment,
unfairness would exist when either (a) there is no legitimate business
reason for the action instigated by the majority; (b) the same legitimate
business objective could be attained by an alternate plan under which
the minority would not be unduly prejudiced; or (c) the asserted busi-
ness objective is dearly secondary in importance to the majority's pur-
pose of improving its position at the minority's expense. With the
exception of item (b), these suggestions involve questions which most
courts customarily consider, and it is difficult to see how item (b) could
have any harmful effect on the efficient operation of a corporation.
2. In any situation in which a minority shareholder's position in the
corporation is substantially impaired-whether as a result of a merger,
sale of assets, charter amendment, or kindred device-it would seem de-
sirable to allow the stockholder to have his shares appraised and pur-
chased by the corporation at a fair value. This could be accomplished by
redrafting the appraisal statutes concerned so as to emphasize the sub-
stantial effect of corporate acts on the stockholder, instead of conditioning
appraisal on the form a squeeze play takes. Thus, rather than granting
appraisal as a matter of course in named types of fundamental changes,
the statute would allow appraisal upon proof that any action taken by
the corporation has eliminated valuable rights of the stockholder or
has resulted in a decrease in the value of his shares.113
112 The "fairness" test has been urged by several writers. See, e.g., Latty, Fairnes
-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. REV. x (x942)
Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalization, 55 HARV. L. REV. 780, 79! (1942).
... Appraisal rights are usually granted automatically to a dissenting stockholder in
the case of a fundamental change such as a merger. It has been suggested, however,
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In order to insure that this remedy is not overlooked by an affected
stockholder, the corporation should also be required to notify the stock-
holders of their appraisal rights whenever a change is proposed which
might give rise to these rights. 14
3. By adopting a provision similar to section 55-5o(i) of the new
North Carolina Business Corporation Act,"15 which requires a corpora-
tion to pay one-third of its annual net profits in dividends upon written
demand of twenty per cent of its stockholders, other states could provide
better protection against excessive dividend withholding.
4. A statutory requirement that all corporations elect their directors
by cumulative voting would help minority interests to gain a voice on
the board of directors in corporations where this would not otherwise be
possible. 16 The presence of a minority shareholder on the board would
probably make the majority group somewhat more reluctant to serve
selfish ends and would also enable the minority to stay better informed,
so that it might protect its interests more intelligently.
5. Finally, it would seem desirable to follow the lead of at least
one state, which has attempted to prevent the recurrence of cases such
as Federal United Corporation v. Havender 17 by making it unlawful
to avoid the statutory restrictions on charter amendments through the
expedient of the merger technique.18
that appraisal rights are often granted unnecessarily. "[R]econsideration might indicate
that appraisal rights should be made to turn less on the shareholder finding himself in a
different legal entity or in an expanded enterprise than on being drastically changed
with respect to participation in earnings, liquidation and control. It might also indicate
that appraisal rights in a sale of assets situation should be granted, and only in, a sale
of assets for securities of the purchaser corporation . . . rather than be denied in all
sales, as is the case in most jurisdictions, or be granted even in sales for cash, as appears
to be the case in some others." Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties in the New Corpora-
tlion Statutes, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 363, 390 (x 95 s), citing with approval a
1953 provision in the New York law denying appraisal rights to shareholders of the
surviving corporaiton in a consolidation when the consolidation does not make such
fundamental changes in the dissenter's share contract as would warrant appraisal rights
in the event of a charter amendment.
.1. The North Carolina Business Corporation Act requires that shareholders must
be notified of their appraisal rights when they are asked to vote on Cetain fundamental
changes. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1OO, 55-108, 55-12, 55-118 (Supp. 1957). See also,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2852-311, 2852-902 (Supp. 1957).
"15 N.C. GEN STAT. § 55-50(i) (Supp. 1957).
"a For a representative statute which requires that shareholders be allowed to
cumulate their votes, see CAL. CoR-'. CODE § 2235 (West 1955).
117 See text at note 38 supra.
.. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-o8(b) (Supp. x957). See Latty, supra note 115, at
387 & n. x61.
